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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 97-5155, 97-5156, 97-5217 & 97-5312 
 
IN RE: PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
AMERICA SALES PRACTICE LITIGATION AGENT ACTIONS 
 
RICHARD P. KRELL, MDL transfer, N.D. Ohio, 
DNJ Civil Action No. 95-6062 
 
v. 
 
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 
 
       Richard P. Krell, as well as Objectors 
       Elizabeth Bajek, Amanda Bajek, 
       Helen Bartsch, Mark Ciconte, 
       Raymond Dolce, Margaret Dolice, 
       Louise Duggan, Peter Duggan, 
       Charles Duncan, Mary Howe, Mary Krell, 
       William Morris, Diana Racer, Thomas Racer, 
       Gweneth Reidel, The Estate of Carl J. Scalzo, 
       Marie Scalzo, Terry Sligar, Alice Smith, 
       Jerry Smith, and William Walton, 
       Appellants at Nos. 97-5155/5156/5312 
 
IN RE: PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
AMERICA SALES PRACTICE LITIGATION AGENT ACTIONS 
 
RICHARD JOHNSON, 
Intervenor-Plaintiff in District Court 
 
       Richard E. Johnson, 
       Appellant at No. 97-5217 
 
 
  
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cv-04704) 
 
Argued January 26, 1998 
 
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed July 23, 1998) 
 
A. The Girsh Factors 
 
Although Krell has not directly challenged the court's 
analysis with respect to each of the nine Girsh factors, we 
will examine each of them in turn. 
 
       1. The complexity and duration of the litigation 
 
Citing the myriad complex legal and factual issues which 
would arise at trial, the district court found the "anticipated 
complexity, costs, and time necessary to try this case 
greatly substantiate the fairness of the settlement." 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 536. The court found 
that litigation would require expensive and time consuming 
discovery, would necessitate the use of several expert 
witnesses, and would not be completed for years. 
Consequently, the court concluded this factor weighed in 
favor of settlement. 
 
We agree. Examining the sheer magnitude of the 
proposed settlement class as well as the complexity of the 
issues raised, we conclude the trial of this class action 
would be a long, arduous process requiring great 
expenditures of time and money on behalf of both the 
parties and the court. The prospect of such a massive 
undertaking clearly counsels in favor of settlement. 61 
 
       2. The reaction of the class to the settlement 
 
This factor attempts to gauge whether members of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
61. We also note that no parties have objected to this portion of the 
district court's analysis. 
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class support the settlement. Although the response rate in 
a 23(b)(3) class action is relevant to the fairness 
determination, see, e.g., Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1313 n.15 
(3d Cir, 1993); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 148 (3d 
Cir. 1978), "a combination of observations about the 
practical realities of class actions has led a number of 
courts to be considerably more cautious about inferring 
support from a small number of objectors to a sophisticated 
settlement." G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 812 (citation omitted). 
 
The district court found that, of the 8 million 
policyholders to whom Prudential sent the class notice, 
approximately 19,000 policyholders or 0.2 per cent of the 
class opted out.62 The court also noted that approximately 
300 policyholders filed objections to the settlement. The 
court found the small percentage of opt outs and objectors 
was "truly insignificant," and noted that the "most 
vociferous objectors to the Proposed Settlement are a 
handful of litigants represented by counsel in cases that 
compete with or overlap the claims asserted in the Second 
Amended Complaint." Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 
537. Consequently, the court concluded the limited number 
of objections filed also weighed in favor of approving the 
settlement. Id. at 537-38. 
 
We see no abuse of discretion. While we do not read too 
much into the low rate of response, we believe the district 
court properly analyzed this factor.63  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
62. The court found that approximately 700 of those who opted out 
wrote "to indicate they do not feel they were misled in the purchase of 
their insurance, are satisfied with their policies, and do not want to 
participate in the action against Prudential." Fairness Opinion, 962 F. 
Supp. at 537 n.61. 
 
63. Krell argues that the low response rate was the result of inadequate 
notice. We disagree. As discussed infra S V.C.2, we believe the class 
notice adequately apprised the class members of their right to enter an 
appearance, file objections, or opt out of the proposed class, and 
provided a detailed explanation of the procedures for doing so. 
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       3. The stage of the proceedings and amount of 
       discovery completed 
 
The parties must have an "adequate appreciation of the 
merits of the case before negotiating." G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d 
at 813. To ensure that a proposed settlement is the product 
of informed negotiations, there should be an inquiry into 
the type and amount of discovery the parties have 
undertaken. Krell contends that class counsel's discovery 
was insufficient to support the proposed settlement, 
claiming that Lead Counsel's pre-settlement discovery 
consisted only of 70 boxes of documents received in August 
1996 pursuant to informal letter requests, and a number of 
meetings with Prudential's chairman, Arthur Ryan. Krell 
questions how Lead Counsel could have been in "second 
stage settlement negotiations" before receiving Prudential's 
production of over 1 million documents, videotapes, audio 
tapes and computer tapes in mid-August. Finally, Krell 
contends there was no vigorous, adversarial discovery 
because "virtually all of Prudential's discovery obligations" 
were stayed between October 1995 and September 10, 
1996, and the parties didn't agree on a free exchange of 
information until August 20, 1996, only a few weeks before 
the proposed settlement was announced. 
 
The district court found that "counsel for plaintiffs and 
Prudential did not commence serious settlement 
discussions until 18 months of vigorous litigation had 
transpired," noting the parties had filed and argued a 
multitude of motions, including consolidation motions, 
jurisdictional motions, motions to stay competing class 
actions, case management motions, and Prudential's 
motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 538 n.62. In addition to its in- 
court efforts, the district court concluded that class 
counsel's pursuit of discovery also supported the 
settlement. The court found class counsel reviewed a 
multitude of documents provided by Prudential,64 
conducted its own interviews with hundreds of current and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
64. This discovery included over 1 million documents, 160 computer 
diskettes, 500 audio and video tapes. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 
541. 
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former Prudential employees, took twenty depositions, and 
had access to all of the materials collected by the Task 
Force. Id. at 541. The district court also found class 
counsel took sufficient time to review the discovery 
materials it collected, noting that class counsel refused to 
discuss settlement on two separate occasions because it 
believed it needed further discovery. Id. (citing Weiss Aff. 
PP 49, 101-02.) Finally, the court found class counsels' "use 
of informal discovery was especially appropriate in this case 
because the Court stayed plaintiffs' right to formal 
discovery for many months, and because informal discovery 
could provide the information that plaintiffs needed." Id. at 
542. Based on the foregoing, the district court concluded 
"the volume and substance of Class Counsel's knowledge of 
this case are unquestionably adequate to support this 
settlement." Id. at 541. We see no error here. 
 
       4. The risks of establishing liability and damages 
 
The fourth and fifth Girsh factors survey the possible 
risks of litigation in order to balance the likelihood of 
success and the potential damage award if the case were 
taken to trial against the benefits of an immediate 
settlement. Examining plaintiffs' ability to establish liability 
and damages at trial, the court concluded "the risks of 
establishing liability weigh in favor of approving the 
settlement." Id. at 540. 
 
We believe the district court properly examined the risks 
faced by the putative class. The court found plaintiffs would 
face a difficult burden at trial demonstrating, inter alia, (1) 
class members were deceived by Prudential's written 
disclosures and illustrations; (2) their contract claims were 
not barred by the parol evidence rule because they conflict 
with the unambiguous language in the insurance contracts; 
(3) the necessary reliance to support their federal securities 
claims; and (4) their federal securities claims were not 
barred by the one year statute of limitations and the three 
year statute of repose. Id. at 539. As further evidence of the 
barriers facing plaintiffs, the district court took notice of a 
similar life insurance sales practice case in Alabama state 
court in which the judge overturned a substantial jury 
verdict against Prudential. Id. (citing Key v. Prudential Ins. 
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Co. of America, Civ. No. 93-479 (Al. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 1995)). 
We believe the district court offered substantial reasons for 
its findings. 
 
        a. Replacement Claims 
 
Krell argues the district court failed to consider 
separately the likelihood of success at trial for those class 
members who alleged "replacement claims," contending 
those claims require a lesser degree of proof and may be 
established by an objective review of the documents in 
Prudential's files. Both Prudential and Lead Counsel 
contend that "replacement policyholders faced similar 
burdens to those of other Class Members in establishing 
liability and damages against Prudential."65 Prudential Brief 
at 35. 
 
The district court did not believe that "replacement 
claims" are easier to prove and therefore required separate 
consideration. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 522. We 
agree. Krell offers no authority or analysis to support this 
blanket assertion. In addition, the findings of the Multi- 
State Task Force undermine Krell's argument. 
 
The primary focus of the Multi-State Task Force was the 
practice known as "churning" or "twisting," which it defined 
as "the sale of any policy based upon incomplete or 
misleading comparisons." Task Force Report at 35. 
According to the Multi-State Task Force Report, the 
transactions most frequently the subject of churning or 
twisting complaints were financed sales and abbreviated 
payment plans. Replacement transactions are a 
subcategory of financed sales in which at least 25% of an 
existing policy's value is used to fund the purchase of a 
new policy. Id. (citing the current NAIC Replacement Life 
Insurance and Annuities Model regulation, adopted in 
1984). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
65. Prudential also notes that Ohio state courts have found that a 
violation of state replacement laws does not give rise to a private cause 
of action. Prudential Brief at 36 (citing Springfield Impregnators, Inc. 
v. 
Ohio State Life Ins. Co., No. C.A. 3090, 1994 WL 95219 at *9 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 23, 1994); Strack v. Westfield Cos., 515 N.E.2d 1005, 1007-8 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986)). 
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The Task Force Report makes clear that "none of these 
types of sales, financed, replacement or abbreviated pay, is 
in violation of the replacement regulation if properly done." 
Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). It also notes that, during the 
late 1970s and early 1980's, the previous industry-wide 
disinclination for replacement sales began to give way. In 
1978, for example, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners modified its model replacement regulations 
to reflect the growing acceptance of replacement sales, 
provided those sales were accompanied by necessary 
information and disclosure to allow consumers to"make an 
informed choice."66 Id.  at 39-40. 
 
Turning to its examination of Prudential, the Task Force 
acknowledged its goal was "to determine whether during 
the sale of new policies, those involving financing or 
replacement, consumers were adequately advised of the 
potential failings of the new policies or the funding basis on 
which they were sold." Id. at 45. The Report notes that 
although all of the required disclosure forms may have been 
completed and filed by Prudential, "[o]ne must look beyond 
the required forms to determine whether or not 
presentations were accurate and not misleading." Id. In its 
discussion of the remediation protocol, the Task Force 
explained "the documentation received from Prudential did 
not always support the consumer's assertion," and 
consequently "[w]hat was or was not agreed upon at the 
time of sale became a question of fact." Id. at 189; see also 
id. at 191 (noting that while "some replacements may have 
been appropriate . . . misrepresentation is never 
appropriate," and thus "the challenge is to distinguish 
appropriate replacement activity.") 
 
Consequently, it appears that misrepresentation, rather 
than compliance with bookkeeping requirements, was the 
primary concern of the Task Force examination of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
66. The Task Force also noted that, in 1985, the Federal Trade 
Commission acknowledged that many older insurance policies were 
"candidates for replacement." Task Force Report at 42-3 (quoting Michael 
P. Lynch and Robert J. Mackay, Life Insurance Products and Consumer 
Information, Staff Report, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade 
Commission, Washington, D.C. (November 1985)). 
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Prudential's replacement sales. As the Task Force Report 
states, it is incorrect "to assume that in any and every case 
where a replacement was not identified or the regulatory 
requirements were not met, the policyholder did not 
understand the transaction or that it was not properly 
explained." Id. at 17. We also find it significant that the 
state insurance regulators who crafted the initial Task 
Force Report did not incorporate a lesser burden of proof or 
otherwise distinguish "replacement claims" from other types 
of claims.67 Consequently, we believe the district court 
properly considered the role of replacement claims when 
analyzing the fourth and fifth Girsh factors.68 
 
       5. The risks of maintaining the class action t hrough 
       trial 
 
Under Rule 23, a district court may decertify or modify a 
class at any time during the litigation if it proves to be 
unmanageable. In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d at 
1011 (3d Cir. 1986); G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 815. In this 
instance, the district court concluded that although"this 
case is manageable as a class action and [ ] the class action 
device is the most appropriate means to adjudicate this 
controversy, as the case evolves, maintaining the class 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
67. We note that even if the different claims alleged by plaintiffs 
require 
proof of different elements to establish liability, those differences are 
adequately addressed during the ADR process. ADR claims will be 
examined using a set of criteria specific to the type of claim filed. For 
example, the evidentiary considerations for a churning claim include 
misstatements by a Prudential agent concerning the applicable interest 
rate on a policy loan, the policyholder's annual income, and the use of 
blank, signed disbursement forms. Prudential Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Guidelines, Stipulation of Settlement, Ex. B, at 17. 
Considerations for a vanishing premium claim include whether the 
policyholder was advised to disregard notices from Prudential, whether 
the policyholder made a "significant financial decision" in reliance on 
the 
belief that premium payments would cease, and whether the policyholder 
received altered or unclear sales materials from an agent. Id. at 26-27. 
 
68. The district court also noted that "[n]one of the four states that 
objected to the Proposed Settlement have ever prohibited financed 
insurance sales and three of the four did not regulate in any respect 
financed insurance sales for great portions of the Class Period." Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 549 n.77. 
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action may become unworkable" and require decertification. 
Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 540. The court also 
noted Prudential had sought to preserve its objections to 
class certification, and would likely contest certification if 
the case proceeded to trial. Consequently, the court 
concluded that there was a risk the case might eventually 
be decertified, all of which weighed in favor of settlement. 
 
Although we agree with the district court's analysis and 
find there was some risk of decertification which supports 
settlement, we pause to comment on the application of this 
factor in "settlement-only" class actions following the 
Supreme Court's decision in Amchem. Because the district 
court always possesses the authority to decertify or modify 
a class that proves unmanageable, examination of this 
factor in the standard class action would appear to be 
perfunctory. There will always be a "risk" or possibility of 
decertification, and consequently the court can always 
claim this factor weighs in favor of settlement. The test 
becomes even more "toothless" after Amchem. The Supreme 
Court in Amchem held a district court could take settlement 
into consideration when deciding whether to certify a class, 
and that, "[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only 
class certification, a district court need not inquire whether 
the case, if tried, would present intractable management 
problems . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial." 117 
S. Ct. at 2248. It would seem, therefore, that after Amchem 
the manageability inquiry in settlement-only class actions 
may not be significant. 
 
       6. The ability of the defendants to withstand a gr eater 
       judgment 
 
The district court found "Prudential's ability to withstand 
a greater judgment is a matter of concern."69 Fairness 
Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 540. Noting that the settlement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
69. Prudential argued that consideration of this factor was unnecessary 
because of the uncapped nature of the relief. The district court rejected 
this claim, noting that while the compensatory relief was uncapped, the 
"punitive damages" component of the settlement- the Additional 
Remediation Amount - was limited, and thus the district court was 
obligated to examine this factor. 
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was valued between $1 billion and $2 billion, the court 
found a larger judgment could negatively impact 
Prudential's declining credit rating.70  Id. The court also 
expressed concern that, because Prudential is a mutual 
insurer, non-class member policyholders could conceivably 
be adversely affected by an excessive settlement in the form 
of lower dividends. Id. 
 
Krell claims the district court erred by finding that 
Prudential could not withstand a greater judgment because 
"neither Lead Counsel nor Prudential submitted any 
reliable evidence of the true value of the ADR relief." Krell 
Brief at 50. Krell speculates that even the $410 million 
minimum is inaccurate because it does not account for 
"profits, if any" generated by Basic Claim Relief. 
 
We see no error here. As the district court noted, the 
value of the proposed settlement is difficult to determine 
because both the compensatory relief available under the 
ADR and the additional relief available through Basic Claim 
Relief are uncapped. The parties' experts offered valuations 
between $1 and $2 billion, with an absolute minimum of 
$410 million. While these numbers are imprecise, they are 
a sufficient basis for the district court to decide whether 
Prudential could withstand a greater judgment. In addition, 
Prudential's credit rating during the course of the litigation 
may be an appropriate indicator, among others, for the 
court's consideration, and its decline would support the 
court's analysis. 
 
       7. The range of reasonableness of the settlement f und 
       in light of the best possible recovery and all the 
       attendant risks of litigation 
 
The last two Girsh factors ask whether the settlement is 
reasonable in light of the best possible recovery and the 
risks the parties would face if the case went to trial. In 
order to assess the reasonableness of a proposed settlement 
seeking monetary relief, "the present value of the damages 
plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
70. The court found that Prudential's credit rating had already declined 
during the course of the litigation. Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 
540. 
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discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should be 
compared with the amount of the proposed settlement." 
G.M. Trucks, 55 F.3d at 806 (quoting Manual for Complex 
Litigation 2d S 30.44, at 252). On appeal, Krell argues the 
district court declined to address this issue, instead finding 
the analysis unnecessary because all injured policyholders 
would receive full compensatory relief. 
 
Krell has mischaracterized the district court's opinion. 
The district court applied the final two Girsh factors, 
although it did not attempt to reduce its analysis to a 
concrete formula. The district court found that calculating 
the best possible recovery for the class in the aggregate 
would be "exceedingly speculative," and in this instance 
such a calculation was unnecessary because the 
reasonableness of the settlement could be fairly judged. The 
court instead examined the nature of the settlement and 
the range of possible outcomes for those participating in 
either the ADR process or Basic Claim Relief, and 
concluded that "an individual's recovery exceeds the value 
of the best possible recovery discounted by the risks of 
litigation." Fairness Opinion, 962 F. Supp. at 540. 
 
For example, the court found class members who have 
clear claims against Prudential will receive scores of "3" and 
will "receive a choice between full rescissionary or 
compensatory relief plus interest." Thus they will receive 
full compensation without paying attorneys fees and 
without undue delay.71 The court concluded this relief "is 
not only fair, it is exceptional." Id. at 540-41. Those class 
members who received a score of "2" - where the evidence 
on balance supports the claim - would receive 50% of their 
damages without having to pay litigation costs or fees, an 
award the court concluded was equivalent to what the 
claimant would have received at trial. Id. at 541 ("The 50% 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
71. In response, Krell contends that the court's belief that full 
compensatory relief is available relies on the flawed "assumption that 
100% of the wrongfully replaced policyholders will understand the notice 
and form the requisite `belief ' and  complete the 16 page proof of claim 
form and thereafter prevail in ADR." Krell Brief at 45. But Krell ignores 
the fact that any claim, whether brought at trial or under the ADR 
process, will require evidence of deceptive conduct in order to support 
liability. 
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award plus 100% interest is equivalent to a full award 
minus litigation costs, attorneys' fees, and the price of 
delay."). The court also found the settlement was fair for 
those receiving a score of "1" in the ADR process and for 
those electing Basic Claim Relief - those who would not 
have had a claim or not elected to bring one - because the 
Basic Claim Relief recovery is greater than what they would 
have gotten at trial.72 Id.  
 
We believe the district court adequately addressed these 
factors and agree its examination "accounts appropriately 
for the nuances of this Proposed Settlement." Id. at 535 
n.58. As the court noted, both the structure of the 
settlement and the uncapped nature of the relief provided 
make it difficult to determine accurately the actual value of 
the settlement. Consequently, the traditional calculus 
suggested by the Manual for Complex Litigation 2d and 
adopted by this Court in G.M. Trucks cannot be applied to 
this case. But we cannot find the district court abused its 
discretion when it found that the remedies available under 
the proposed settlement provided extraordinary relief. When 
balanced against the best possible recovery and the risks of 
taking this case to trial, these remedies weighed in favor of 
the proposed settlement. 
 
It is worth noting that since Girsh was decided in 1975, 
there has been a sea-change in the nature of class actions, 
especially with respect to mass torts. In this regard, it may 
be useful to expand the traditional Girsh factors to include, 
when appropriate, these factors among others: the maturity 
of the underlying substantive issues, as measured by 
experience in adjudicating individual actions, the 
development of scientific knowledge, the extent of discovery 
on the merits, and other factors that bear on the ability to 
assess the probable outcome of a trial on the merits of 
liability and individual damages; the existence and probable 
outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses; the 
comparison between the results achieved by the settlement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
72. The district court also took notice of the procedural safeguards 
contained in the ADR process, including the four tier review process 
designed to ensure an accurate and fair scoring of class members' 
claims. See discussion supra S I.B.1. 
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for individual class or subclass members and the results 
achieved - or likely to be achieved - for other claimants; 
whether class or subclass members are accorded the right 
to opt out of the settlement; whether any provisions for 
attorneys' fees are reasonable; and whether the procedure 
for processing individual claims under the settlement is fair 
and reasonable.73 Of these factors, the only one relevant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
73. See Edward H. Cooper, Mass Torts Model, prepared for the 
Conference On Mass Torts, Mass Torts Working Group, Philadelphia, PA 
(May 1998). 
 
Other related factors that also may be relevant to this inquiry are 
discussed by Judge William Schwarzer in his article, Settlement of Mass 
Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 837, 843-44 
(May 1995). The factors suggested by Judge Schwarzer include: 
 
       (1) Whether the prerequisites set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) 
[of 
       Rule 23] have been met; 
 
       (2) Whether the class definition is appropriate and fair, taking 
into 
       account among other things whether it is consistent with the 
       purpose for which the class is certified, whether it may be 
       overinclusive or underinclusive, and whether division into 
       subclasses may be necessary or advisable; 
 
       (3) Whether persons with similar claims will receive similar 
       treatment, taking into account any differences in treatment between 
       present and future claimants; 
 
       (4) Whether notice to members of the class is adequate, taking into 
       account the ability of persons to understand the notice and its 
       significance to them; 
